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Abstract
A Black Swan, as termed by Nassim Taleb, is an unexpected, high magnitude event that
is often rationalized in hindsight. 9/11 and the Financial Crisis of 2008 are two examples of these
tail probability events. Though COVID-19 has been regarded as momentous and unexpected,
Taleb does not credit it as a true Black Swan. This paper aims to compare COVID-19 to these
recent Black Swans in terms of predictability and significance. Cointegration was tested across
11 major sectors. Further economic indicators were explored with the goal of discussing the
broader context of each event. It was concluded that COVID-19 was predictable as compared to
the other two events. However, the economic weight of COVID-19 is quite comparable to that of
the Financial Crisis of 2008 and should not be ignored.

Introduction
Nassim Taleb, a prolific author, and former options trader, has written extensively about
Black Swans. He described these in his book The Black Swan as:
“…First, it is an outlier, as it lies outside the realm of regular expectations,
because nothing in the past can convincingly point to its possibility. Second, it
carries an extreme impact. Third, in spite of its outlier status, human nature makes
us concoct explanations for its occurrence after the fact, making it explainable and
predictable.” (Taleb, Prologue).
These events are catastrophic to society and the stock market in nature. Global
phenomena such as the 9/11 attacks and the Financial Crisis of 2008 have been anecdotes that
display the dangerous nature of the Black Swan. In his book, Taleb clarifies these phenomena
cannot be anticipated, as we humans have been inclined to concentrate on what is proximate and
ordinary. As explained in the prologue, we have been hardwired to stratify the unknown into a
normal curve: the Gaussian Distribution or bell curve. Social life itself is measured by large,
sporadic jumps from the norm. Whether good or bad, these events are perceived as out of the
expectations stratified by this normal curve. Thus, our human systems cannot fathom, let alone
prepare for such events. Consequently, the event itself also carries a massive impact. The 9/11
attacks killed thousands of Americans and catalyzed the War on Terror. The Financial Crisis of
2008 leached from approximately $9.8 trillion in wealth (Merle, 2018).
An irritated Taleb recently argued that the pandemic was reasonably predicted in a
January 2020 paper that he co-authored with Joseph Norman and Yaneer Bar-Yam when the
virus was still in China. It was concluded that the increased globalization of the world coupled
1

with the infectiousness of COVID-19 requires us to imagine beyond expectations and not
amount preparedness to fear (Bam, Norman, Taleb, 2020). With this, Taleb has denied COVID19 as a Black Swan, as it was predictable, just inadequately prepared for (Avishai, 2020). In this
research paper, I ponder whether COVID-19 is predictable as compared to 9/11 and the Financial
Crisis and evaluate the respective damages to the economy. The premise of predictability is
explored in this paper. For example, Harvard scholar and NYU economics professor, Nouriel
Roubini, warned that the US housing market was due to burst before the Financial Crisis of
208(Kapoor, 2018). Raghuram Rajan, former Chief Economist and Director of Research at the
International Monetary Fund, warned in 2006 that the development of financial instruments like
credit default swaps and mortgage-backed securities has incentivized banks to make riskier
decisions that would lead to a catastrophic crash (Kapoor, 2018). The Financial Crisis of 2008, a
prime and enduring example of a Black Swan, to some degree, was predicted. The purpose of
this paper is to discern whether COVID-19 should be associated with these phenomena.
Through the lens of predictability and magnitude, I compare the economic milieu of the
9/11 attacks, the 2007 Financial Crisis, and COVID-19 to open discourse about the possibility of
COVID-19 being a Black Swan event. A vast range of economic indicators are explored
including, but not limited to, consumer confidence, business confidence, unemployment, and
VIX data. Further, price data has been collected on 11 sectors of the U.S. economy, stratified by
exchange-traded funds, specifically SPDR select sector ETFs and Blackrock iShares ETFs. I use
both cointegration and correlation tests on these ETF prices before and after the alleged Black
Swan event to compare the effects of 9/11, the Financial Crisis, and COVID-19 across 11 sectors
of our economy. I use cointegration to assess correlations of time series in the long term. The
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goal is not to fully detect COVID-19 as Black Swan, but to provide an open discourse on the
possibility.

Data and procedures
I observe price data for 11 sectors of the economy as proxied by certain exchange-traded
funds. If possible, Select S&P500 SPDR industry funds are used. This is true for technology
(XLK), energy (XLE), utilities (XLU), materials (XLB), staples (XLP), discretionary (XLY),
industrials (XLI), healthcare (XLV), and financials (XLF). Because the inception of the real
estate and communications SP500 select sector ETFs were after 9/11, I use Blackrock iShares
ETFs of IYZ and IYR for communications and real estate sectors, respectively. I track these 11
ETF prices for an equal period of 150 trading days before and after 9/11, the Financial Crisis of
2008, and 9/11. This results in approximately 7 months of data before and after each event.
I use the dates of 9/11/2001, 9/15/2008, and 02/12/2020 as the event dates for the 9/11
attacks, Financial Crisis and COVID-19, respectively. I select 9/11/2001 as the day of the attacks
in New York City and use 9/15/2008 as marking the bankruptcy of Lehman Brother’s investment
bank. Though the inception date of COVID-19 is hard to pinpoint, 02/12/2020 marks a day in
which the World Health Organization issued a large press conference about the prospects of the
novel coronavirus (World Health Organization, 2020).
I test for cointegration both before and after each event for the 55 unique pairings of
ETFs. The null hypothesis, or H0, states that there is no cointegration between the two time
series. I use a 5% level of significance, hence a p-value below 0.05 rejects the null hypothesis
that there is no cointegration. When comparing the count of changed cointegration status across
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all pairings of sectors, I can gauge just how much long-term change is occurring across all
economic sectors due to the event occurring.
I examine consumer and business confidence, retrieved from the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The Business Confidence Index (BCI)
captures the growth of outputs, whereas the Consumer Confidence Index (CCI) indicates
household consumption and savings, with values above 100 indicating optimism and values
below 100 indicating pessimism (OECD, n.d.) This data is useful in parsing the reaction of both
businesses and consumers. Unemployment data is taken from The St. Louis Federal Reserve
database. Price data regarding the 11 sectors and the VIX is from the Yahoo Finance Website. I
also include graphs from Our World in Data, which has compiled great data on the Coronavirus
at large.

4

The Black Swan
It is imperative to fully understand the meaning of Black Swan first. A concept
consistently mentioned in Taleb’s book, The Black Swan, is the limitations of efficacy in which
the normal distribution truly explains our reality. Though the curve itself is used uniformly by
many to describe future uncertainty, the Gaussian distribution has pushed us to focus on the
menial and the normal. The curve follows the empirical rule, which states that approximately
68%, 95%, and 99.7% of values fall within one, two, and three standard deviations of the mean,
respectively. For the longest time, this distribution has proven to be the principal practice in
determining uncertainty.
One problem with this curve is that it brings about a fallacy in which we, as humans,
neglect the possibility of Black Swans. One reason for this is the “increase of the decrease,” as
said by Taleb in probability as values move away from the mean. “The main point of the
Gaussian, as I've said, is that most observations hover around the mediocre, the average; the odds
of a deviation decline faster and faster (exponentially) as you move away from the average”
(Taleb, pg 231). He portrays this by showing a table of the odds in moving from 1 to 10 standard
deviations away from the mean (Table, pg. 231-232)

5

German Marks: Beyond all Expectations
I analyze the historical exchange rate between German Marks and the U.S. dollar for the
years of 1920 through 1922 in Exhibit 1.
Exchange rate Data is from Professor

Exhibit 1 Historical Exchange Rates Between German
Marks and US Dollars

Harold Marcuse, of Santa Barbara
University, who compiled historical

Date

Marks to USD

exchange rates between German Marks

1920-Feb

100.5

and USD into a public webpage. As seen

1920-Apr

60.5

in Exhibit 1, the exchange rate was

1920-Jun

40.25

already steadily rising following World I

1920-Oct

60.45

repayments. From this data, I was able to

1921-Jan

57.00

calculate a mean of 766.91 and a standard

1921-Jun

63.00

deviation of 1783.90. We know that the z-

1921-Oct

124.00

score is defined as how many standard

1922-Jan

186.00

deviations a value is from the mean.

1922-Feb

204.00

1923-Mar

230.00

1922-Jul

402.00

1922-Aug

644.00

1922-Oct

1,815.00

1922-Dec

6,750.00

Thus, in Exhibit 2, each value in
column 1 represents a subsequent jump in
1 standard deviation from the mean of
766.91. We see that the odds decline in an
exponential fashion, increasing more and
more as we move away from the mean.
For argument’s sake, let us ponder the odds of the most unlikely scenario. Even with a large
standard deviation and somewhat volatile data, the odds of the exchange rate increasing to
6

18,606 to 1 is approximately 1 in 130 sextillions. Rational human beings see this staggering
number and immediately dismiss it from the realm of possibility. After all, the odds of being
struck by lightning each year are 1 in 500,000 and the odds of winning the Powerball Grand
Prize is 1 in 292,201,338, according to the CDC and Powerball website correspondingly.
Exhibit 2

Odds Corresponding to the German Markets and US Dollars
Marks to USD

Z-Score Odds (approximately)

2551

1

1 in 6.3

4335

2

1 in 44

6119

3

1 in 740

7902

4

1 in 32,000

9686

5

1 in 3,500,000

11470

6

1 in 1,000,000,000

13254

7

1 in 780,000,000,000

15038

8

1 in 1,600,000,000,000,000

16822

9

1 in 8,900,000,000,000,000,000

18606

10

1 in 130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000

Let us imagine, for a second, that we are a German Citizen in December 1922. We see
that the currency is already heavily inflated, even rising sharply in recent time. We are concerned
with the possibilities of the currency inflating more and decide to utilize the gaussian curve to
understand the probability of future inflation. We would be astounded to learn that the exchange
rate a year later, in December 1923, would become 3.43 billion to 1 USD, according to the
Harold Marcuse data. It is almost unthinkable how small of a probability this would be under the
7

standard normal distribution. Now, the point is not that the probability distribution is wrong or
should be replaced. However, it does constrain our perception of the probability of tail events.
The framework does not do a great job in explaining extreme events. Taleb talks about tail
fragility in The Black Swan:
“One of the most misunderstood aspects of a Gaussian is its fragility and
vulnerability in the estimation of tail events. The odds of a 4-sigma move are twice that
of a 4.15 sigma. The odds of a 20 sigma are a trillion times higher than those of a 21
sigma! It means that a small measurement error of the sigma will lead to a massive
underestimation of the probability. We can be a trillion times wrong about some events”
(Taleb, pg 232).

Scalability and Inequality
Given that the three events studied in this paper are from recent history, it is essential to
explain the effect of globalization on these tail events. Taleb references the research done by
economist Sherwin Rosen in explaining how globalization brings about inequality. Rosen wrote
about the phenomenon of Superstars, in which a small amount of people possess large amounts
of capital and dominate the field in which they involve themselves. Thus, power and influence
are quite concentrated among a small group of people (Sherwin, 1981). As explained in The
Black Swan, this inequality seems to originate from a tournament effect. Imagine there are two
up-and-coming painters that are competing for you to buy their art pieces. You can only buy one
piece. One artist has been renowned for their work, being acknowledged heavily around the
world. The other is a recent college graduate who is talented, yet less known. In this case, the
more renowned artist will most likely win your money. In fact, the renowned artist must be only
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marginally more successful to get the whole pot. Taleb sees this as a tournament that
increasingly favors winners. Thus, winners keep winning and losers are left usually with little-tonothing. This all-or-nothing relationship presents itself in an increasingly globalized marketplace
and has brought about the advent of scalability in the workforce. Scalable careers generally have
massive inequalities in which the income generated is not relative to output. Thus, there is no cap
to success.

Extremistan and Mediocristan
The opposing concept to a scalable job is one that is constrained to the effort of the
worker or the amount produce; they are unscalable. Let us compare Bon Jovi to a commissiononly sales representative. The income of Bon Jovi is not dependent on the number of hours he
works in a day. He can record a song and duplicate it free of cost to reach more people and gain
larger contracts with record labels. There is seemingly no constraint on how much income he can
generate. Comparatively, the income of the commission-only sales representative is constrained
to the number of calls made. He has no salary; if he is sick from work then no money will be
made. In The Black Swan, Taleb differentiates two distinct uncertainties of Mediocristan and
Extremistan. Uncertainties from Mediocristan are relatively predictable, subject to constraints,
and can be modeled by a normal distribution whereas Extremistan uncertainty lacks constraint,
creates giants and dwarves, and is conducive to Black Swan Events (table 1, pg 36). Keep these
uncertainties in mind when continuing this paper.

9

An Analysis of the September 11th Attacks
Predictability of 9/11: Short vs. Long Term Events
There is no argument against the fact that 9/11 was an unpredictable event. Taleb
ponders the Pacific Tsunami of 2004. He explains that this tsunami if predicted, would
not have done the same damage as it would have done, as the areas would have been
evacuated. Short-term Black Swan events are those that occur at a singular point of time
and can be easily avoided to limit human and economic loss. These events can be avoided
through less decision-making. Using our hindsight bias, we can concoct a relatively
simplistic idea of how to avoid a short-term event with little to no effort. For example, as
Taleb said in The Black Swan,
“Assume that a legislator with courage, influence, intellect, vision, and
perseverance manages to enact a law that goes into universal effect and
employment on September 10, 2001; it imposes the continuously locked
bulletproof doors in every cockpit (at high costs to the struggling airlines)— just
in case terrorists decide to use planes to attack the World Trade Center in New
York City…it would certainly have prevented 9/11” (Taleb, Prologue)
First, these short-term, shocking events are much less predictable than long-term events.
A natural disaster or terrorist attack can arise without sending any signal or warning to the
public. Once the warning becomes known, the event itself unfolds quickly and in a chaotic
manner. Long-term events, like the Financial Crisis of 2008 and COVID-19, differ in that there
are usually more signals that warn the public about a potentially dangerous event. Furthermore,
long-term events unfold much slower and thus take a longer period to revert to normal. If one
10

goes back to right before the Financial Crisis or even Covid-19, is there one decision or policy
that would wholly avoid these disasters? I believe that the underpinnings of long-term events are
evasive and more complicated than short-term events.
Another difference between short-term and long-term events is that the latter is more
convoluted and the result of many successive events. There is no singular, devastating
experience but rather a slow fallout of the economy. These events are much more confusing, as
they are usually the effect of many successive conditional events. COVID-19 occurs because our
world is more connected than ever before, allowing a pathogen to spread exponentially. The
Financial Crisis exposed a flawed financial system full of devious, volatile derivatives that were
ripe for distaster. Unlike the bulletproof doors for 9/11 and the evacuation for the tsunami, there
is not exactly a proximate decision that can halt these events. They are the effect of many
underlying societal behaviors.

Economic Impacts of the 9/11 Attacks
So, 9/11 was not predictable, fulfilling the first condition of a Black Swan, but did it
create a massive impact? The toll of 9/11 is seen through massive human casualty. Suzanne
Thompson (2006) interviewed 501 people about their response to 9/11 two years after the event
itself. According to Thompson (2006), after 9/11 65% of participants felt distressed and 55% felt
a stronger fear of flying, and levels of distress seemed to be surprisingly high even two years
after the attacks. Distress and anxiety about flying placed stress upon the aviation and
transportation sector following 9/11.
This stress was furthered by the immediate response put forth by the Aviation and
Transportation Safety Act. This legislation forced both passengers and carriers to pay fees
11

including but not limited to salaries of screening personnel, the cost of training said personnel,
administration of the Federal Air Marshall program, performance of background investigations,
the execution of civil aviation security research, and more (Nosab, 2002). Nosab (2002) also
noted that the increase in transportation and communications costs threatened global supply
chains and specifically lowered both consumer and business confidence. The initial shock
coupled with the costly implementation of new regulations added stress to both consumers and
firms around the world. However, using data gathered from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, we can see in Exhibit 3 that the decline was minuscule and
recovered quickly after the attacks.
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Exhibit 3

Consumer and Business Confidence 9/11

Commented [PPD1]: Change the table to a graph (Exhibit
5(

9/11 brought out a short-term increase in unemployment in the United States. Nosab
(2020) further explains the closure of many businesses created a short-term increase in
unemployment. Exhibit 4 shows an increase of about 570,000 unemployed persons between
September and October 2001. Unemployment seemed to be somewhat static in both 2000 and
2002. Exhibit 4 shows that the increase came immediately after 9/11 and remained at higher
aggregate totals for the remainder of 2002.
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Exhibit 4

Unemployed persons 16 Years of Age and Older (000s)

10000

UNEMPLOYED PERSONS(000S)

9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
Jan

Feb Mar Apr May Jun
2000

2001

Jul

Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
2002

YEAR

Bryan Roberts (2009) confirmed Nosab’s remark, stating 598,000 extra people were
caused to file for unemployment due to 9/11 and that the rise was quite short in nature, being felt
Q4 of 2001. The orange bars in Exhibit 4 represent the year in which 9/11 occurred, revealing a
short-term increase in unemployment after September 2001.
However, the unemployment rate was already a concern before 9/11, steadily rising in
the year 2001. According to a CNN Money article from September 7th, 2001, unemployment
was a prior apprehension in which the Federal Reserve was trying to alleviate, cutting rates 7
times in 2001 to combat unemployment. We can conclude that up until 9/11 there was already a
large amount of job loss and economic pullback that was causing concern.

14

Exhibit 5

Federal Funds and Unemployment Rate Before and After 9/11
Commented [PPD2]: Leave the title off the graph and use
the Exhibit title
Commented [UBMu3R2]: Fixed

In Exhibit 5 I graph the effective federal funds rate as well as unemployment, taken from
the St. Louis Federal Reserve database for the years of 1998-2004. The graph illustrates this
gradual rise in unemployment as well as the Fed’s responsive interest rate cuts. The blue dotted
lines express 150 days before and after 9/11 represented by the middle line. The unemployment
rate overtakes the Federal Reserve rate in October 2001. So, we cannot conclude that the rise in
the unemployment rate in Q4 of 2001 is fully due to the 9/11 attacks as it was already an
escalating issue at the time. However, there was an acute rise in unemployment following the
attacks. Furthermore, as said in the previously mentioned CNN Money article, the
unemployment rate is a lagged variable.
15

The price data for the 11 sectors gives a broader idea of how economic relationships
changed. As seen in the correlogram in Exhibit 6, most sectors were correlated with each other
prior to 9/11. One change we can see occur due to 9/11 is the communications sector becoming
negatively correlated with many of the sectors. This is due to the continued falling of the
communications price as compared to other sectors. Exhibit 6 shows this red vein of negative
correlation for the communications sector following the 9/11 attacks.
Exhibit 6

Correlation Among Sectors Before and After 9/11

This change in correlation can be easily seen in Exhibit 7, which compares the price of
XLV, the SP500 select healthcare sector ETF with XLC, communications. Why did
communications slide further down as compared to other sectors?

16

Exhibit 7

Communications and Healthcare Sectors Before and After 9/11

A 2002 article from The New York Times examined the failure of communication
between first responders in the article, FATAL CONFUSION: A Troubled Emergency Response;
9/11 Exposed Deadly Flaws In Rescue Plan. The attack exposed critical flaws in the
communication itself, as well as the technology involved between first responders as evacuation
warnings were given. As written by Jim Dwyer and Kevin Flynn (2002), pilots sent
transmissions 21 minutes before the North Tower fell, but many responders did not receive the
order and perished inside the buildings. There were repeated failures in communications systems
that stymied the rescue effort of firemen, policemen and first responders (Dwyer, Flynn, 2002).
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According to a New York times analysis within the Flynn (2002) article, this lack of information
caused some 121 firefighters to perish in the collapse of the North Tower. These first responders
were heavily reliant on telecommunications in times of disaster. The article recounts the gripes
by Chief Peter Hayden, who was at the scene, saying, “We had ordered the firefighters down, but
we weren’t getting acknowledgments. We were very concerned about it. The radios that
firefighters were using were over 15 years old” (Dwyer, Flynn 2002). Former director of New
York City Office of Emergency Management bluntly explained the resistance to technology:
‘We’re dinosaurs’” (Dwyer, Flynn 2002). I believe that citizens singled the lacking
telecommunications out as a large issue in the response to 9/11 as compared to other sectors,
driving the SP500 Select Communications ETF price much lower in respect to other sectors,
which eventually rebounded.
As said by Farzana Nosab (2002), immediate impacts were noticeable in the industrial
and financial sectors as the total amount of immediate insurance claims summed upwards of $80
billion. Financial institutions were an immediate victim of the 9/11 attacks. As seen in Exhibit 8,
the prices of the Financial and Industrial sector ETFs plummeted heavily following 9/11 and
took months to recover. We can clearly see that the price behavior shifted downward after the
attacks.

18

Exhibit 8

The Effects of 9/11 on the Stock Market

Though the price shifted downward, overall volatility was not heavily affected. The variance in
price beforehand for the Financial and industrial sectors were respectively 0.35 and .97 as
compared to 0.41 and 1.02 after the attacks. We can see this short-term dip quickly revert
within the span of a month. So, 9/11 saw a quick decline in price, without a large injection of
volatility in the financial and industrial sectors.
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Seen in Exhibit 9 is the holding period return for the Post-9/11 period (150 days after).
Despite Communications and Utilities, every sector was able to generate positive returns. This is
congruent with the fact that communications were more heavily affected than other sectors
because of 9/11. Furthermore, 9/11 did not have a long-lasting effect on the stock market
compared to the other events studied.
Exhibit 9

Post-9/11 Sector Holding Period Return
0.37

0.40
0.27

0.30

0.27

0.20
0.10

0.16

0.15

XLF

IYR

0.13
0.04

0.02

0.01

0.00
-0.10

-0.06

-0.20
-0.21
-0.30
XLK

XLE

XLU

XLB

XLP

XLY

XLI

IYZ

XLV
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Exhibit 10

Results of Cointegration for Sectors Pre and Post-9/11
P-value Pre-9/11

P-value Post-9/11

Technology and Energy

0.003

0.481

Technology and Utilities

0.003

0.550

Technology and Communications

0.042

0.621

Utilities and Industrial

0.019

0.243

Materials and Industrial

0.041

0.796

Staples and Discretionary

0.282

0.046

Staples and Industrial

0.364

0.010

Staples and Healthcare

0.438

0.036

Communications and Real Estate

0.029

0.544

Presented in Exhibit 10 are the cointegration results for the sectors which experienced a
change in cointegration due to the 9/11 attacks. Grey boxes signify a significant P-value and
cointegration. Thus, of the 55 unique relationships between industries, only 9 changed. This will
be compared with both the Financial Crisis and COVID-19 later.
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An Analysis of the Financial Crisis of 2008
Pre-Crisis Economic Environment
Let us first analyze the economic environment during the time of the Financial crisis. A
thorough look into the macroeconomic scape of the U.S. will allow us to determine whether the
Financial crisis was predictable or not. Society has become more interconnected than ever as
globalization has allowed banks to assimilate into fewer, larger entities. Thorsten Beck, Asli
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Ross Levine (2003) elucidate the relationship between bank consolidation,
bank regulations and national institutions in determining the likelihood of a systemic banking
crisis. The two diatomic viewpoints are “concentration-stability” and “concentration-fragility”
(Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Ross Levine, 2003). Using data from 70 countries between 1980 and
1997, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003) found that crises are less likely in economies
with more concentrated banking systems, less governing limitations, and nationalized institutions
that encourage competition. Furthermore, the U.S. has been making strides towards
consolidation every year. Exhibit 11 shows data on the U.S. Commercial banks and Deposits in
Billions, Large Domestic Banks, as given by the St. Louis Federal Reserve. There existed 14,381
banks in Q1 1985 compared to 7,314 banks in Q1 2007. This decline in the total number of
banks is the result of high merger activity paired with little chartering. The 1990s decade saw
mergers increase by 6,020 and charters decrease by 5,332 and there have been approximately
16,000 bank mergers over the last 40 years (Bankingstrategist.com, n.d.) Further, Exhibit 11
shows that as the number of banks in the U.S. has been decreasing, deposits in large domestic
banks are increasing.
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Fewer banks became responsible for more deposits leading up to the Financial Crisis.
Further, there was heavy deregulation of the banking sector throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
Exhibit 11

Consolidation of US Banks, 1984-2020

This deregulation was tracked by Matthew Sherman (2009), who created a timeline to parse the
significant legislative rulings in favor of deregulation. Marquette vs. First of Omaha, in 1978,
essentially freed banks from their state of chartering (Sherman, 2009). This allowed Banks to
escape the usury requirements as set forth by their state This created a spirited race of
deregulation (Sherman, 2009). These easing measures were followed by the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1982, which eliminated all interest rate
ceilings and increased deposit insurance from $40,000 to $100,000 (Sherman, 2009). Following
numerous other deregulating measures, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching
Efficiency Act was passed in 1994, which repealed the McFadden Act of 1927, creating an
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interstate banking system (Sherman, 2009). Finally, in 1996, the federal reserve reinterpreted the
Glass-Steagall Act, now allowing for banks to house the activities of investment banking and
retail banking and earn up to 25% of their revenues from investment banking (Sherman, 2009).
These alleviating measures allowed Citicorp to follow through on a groundbreaking
merger in 1998, becoming the largest financial services company (Sherman, 2009) with more
than $698 billion of assets, shooting their stock from $35.625 to $178.50 and helping the Dow
move convincingly beyond the 9000 level (Martin, 1998). Investors were bullish in response to
this passing and saw a new, more consolidated future for banking. This merger epitomized the
amalgamation of resources and responsibility into massive entities as compared to spread out
through smaller, regional organizations. The public was quite pleased with the deal, as stock
prices rose heavily following the news. Many saw this as a bolstering opportunity to combine
many services into a common unit and simplify finance for the U.S. citizen. Chairman of
Citicorp John Reed explained this sentiment, as people do not have to move between
organizations to have access to the same products and can access many products from one firm,
simplifying the transaction (Martin, 1998). At this time, many were identifying with the
previously discussed “consolidation-stability,” put forth by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Ross Levine
(2003). Chairman of Traveler’s Corp echoed this sentiment in a Property and Casualty article,
that:
“Because the world economy changes at an unprecedented pace today, and
regions, markets, continents and businesses are more and more interdependent,
consumers, corporations, institutions and governments around the globe increasingly
need a financially strong and reliable source for financial advisory services and
products"(PropertyandCasualty.com, 1998).
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It seemed that legislators felt similarly, as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was passed a
year after this merger repealing the Glass-Steagall Act completely. (Sherman, 2009). Thus,
regulation of operations in the banking industry has become incredibly hands-off and financial
entities were now able to create huge, global conglomerates that have incredible autonomy over
their operations. This created a turning point, in which many people became concerned about the
implications of this massive consolidation and started empathizing with the Beck, DemirgüçKunt, Ross Levine (2003) “concentration-fragility” standpoint. Many argued that consolidation
in banking was an inevitable evolution and championed it as financial modernization, but the
changes posed challenges for market regulators (Sherman, 2009). Not only did banks become
more modernized, but they now also possessed resources and the capability to function in a
global atmosphere. This sort of environment is reminiscent of Taleb’s previously discussed
Extremistan. It is scalable, there are no physical constraints on what profits can be, and it is
dominated by extreme winner-take-all inequality (Table 1, pg. 36). In his chapter, Naïve
Globalization, Taleb shows that this newfound globalization in the financial market creates a
paradoxical reality between the two ideologies of concentration-stability and concentrationfragility, as
“[globalization] creates interlocking fragility, while reducing volatility and giving
the appearance of stability… We are gliding into disorder, but not necessarily bad
disorder. This implies that we will see more periods of calm and stability, with most
problems concentrated into a small number of Black Swans” (Taleb, pg. 225)
The advent of large conglomerate banks allows for more constancy through the merging
of resources into fewer entities that do not vary from territory to territory. Thus, it is more
standardized and can be scaled across countries. However, this creates a new and uncharted
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economic territory. Though less malignant events seem to occur in consolidated economies, they
are usually more disastrous and widespread.
The deregulating measures allowed for incredible innovation in the banking sector that
regulators struggled to manage. Since banking and securities and insurance operations could be
housed under the same roof, regulators from several different agencies might be responsible for
overseeing different parts of the same institution. The arrangement could be confusing and
inefficient as regulators struggled to keep pace with the innovations in financial markets. The
usage of derivatives, which derive their value from other claims and assets and can be leveraged
heavily increased rapidly (Sherman, 2009). Brooksley Born, chairwoman of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission, argued that without regulation of these derivatives, more
uncertainty was injected into the economy and was abruptly shut down by the Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan. (Sherman, 2009). Consequently, in 2000, the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act was put into practice, prohibiting the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission from regulating many over-the-counter derivatives contracts, including credit
default swaps (Sherman, 2009).

Housing Market Bubble
So, the financial landscape leading up to the year 2007 saw a hasty progression towards
Taleb’s Extremistan through many legislative efforts to streamline the financial sector. With this,
came a change in the mortgage market. Mortgages were becoming highly speculative and
overcomplicated. Many consumers were not privy to the technical workings of derivatives and
mortgage lenders targeted lower income, higher risk borrowers (Sherman, 2009). The housing
market saw unprecedented growth and speculation as a response. The hands-off approach and
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lack of regulating powers over derivatives handcuffed regulators’ abilities to contain these
practices.
Let us remember the first condition of a Black Swan, being that the event itself is
unpredictable. Margaret Hwang Smith and Gary Smith (2006) refer to a definition of a financial
bubble from Charles Kindleberger, an economic historian and author of over 30 books, when
defining a bubble. He defined a bubble as:
“a sharp rise in price of an asset or a range of assets in a continuous process, with the
initial rise generating expectations of further rises and attracting new buyers-generally
speculators interested in profits from trading in the asset rather than its use or earning capacity.
The rise is usually followed by a reversal of expectations and a sharp decline in price often
resulting in financial crisis” (Smith, Smith 2006).
The research done by Smith and Smith (2006) uses a bevy of statistical techniques to
ascertain whether the market prices of houses in California are comparable to their intrinsic value
in response to sharp increases in house prices throughout 2006. It was concluded that, while the
housing prices have increased rapidly in recent years, causing unrealistic expectations of future
prices, they were still a fundamentally sound investment (Smith, Smith 2006). Robert J. Shiller,
American economist, best-selling author, and Sterling Professor of Economics at Yale
University, and Christopher Mayer, Paul Milstein Professor of Real Estate at Columbia Business
school, added to the discussion of the topic of a housing bubble at the end of the paper. Mayer
and Shiller both held that though the paper had a sound conceptual base, it left out impactful
factors and focused on some issues more than others. Thus, its seen that many were concerned
about the speculation caused by deregulation. However, research on bubbles is quite convoluted
and there are too many factors that envelope the difference in pricing and fundamental value.
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Regarding the predictability of the Financial Crisis, we must refer to the Efficient Market
Hypothesis. True believers of the theory will deny that prices ever differ from fundamental
values. The existence of bubbles seems to be an anomaly against the widely accepted theory.
This paradoxical fact is discussed in a Chicago Booth Review Interview with Eugene Fama and
Richard Thaler. Eugene Fama is a Nobel Laureate in Economic Sciences and Richard H. Thaler
is the 2017 recipient of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for his contributions to
behavioral economics. The two hold differing ideologies of bubbles in respect to bubbles.
Eugene Fama suggests that these anomalies are simply curiosity items as prices, reflect
information whereas Richard Thaler places more emphasis on anomalies as evidence against the
Efficient Market Hypothesis (Chicago Booth Review, 2016). However, they both agree that is
inexplicably difficult, if not impossible to explain stock returns based on a model and that
currently there is no model to irrefutably identify a bubble before its occurrence.
Let us reconcile some key facts about the predictability of the financial crisis. Though
there were concerns of rising prices in the housing market in 2006, there was not enough concern
to initiate legislative correction. Second, as seen in the discussions of Shiller and Mayer in
response to Smith and Smith (2006), the models presented are biased and neglect many pieces of
data necessary to ascertain whether prices differ from intrinsic value in the housing market. Both
Thaler and Fama (2016) echo this, expressing the lack and necessity of models that detect these
bubbles to further understand our economy and prevent damage. The heavy deregulation of the
banking sector starting in the 1980s has made our financial sector more conglomerated and less
diversified. Further, the legal measures and sheer operating size of these banks strain the ability
of regulatory authorities. This environment led to questionable derivatives that led to speculation
in the housing market. These factors allowed for a few individuals to predict the possibility of a
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collapse, as stated in the introduction. However, there is no model that can irrefutably detect the
presence of a bubble in our society. Further, as Eugene Fama (2016) states, even if regulatory
authorities could detect these bubbles, it is not certain they could take intermittent measures and
could even make the problem worse.

Economic Impacts of the Financial Crisis of 2008
Let us move into the magnitude of the downfall itself. As determined in the preceding
paragraphs, the events leading to the Financial Crisis were concerning, yet did not signal an
impending collapse. The heavy ease of regulation on the financial sector allowed for substandard
practices in the mortgage market. Lenders then targeted lower income and higher-risk borrowers,
creating subprime loans (Sherman, 2009). Furthermore, the characteristic investor in real estate
was quite unsophisticated. Karl E. Case and Robert J. Shiller (2003) posed surveys about
housing investors’ sentiments about the housing market. It was found that both buyers and
selling were overwhelmingly novices, typically reacting to information from the business section
of a newspaper or word of mouth. The coupling of targeting higher-risk buyers and the lack of
experience in overall real estate investing led to the financial crisis occurring. According to
Sherman (2009), financial hardship comparable to the Great Depression ensued upon the
bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers and the liquidation of Bear Stearns. Let us compare the
magnitude of the Financial Crisis to the 9/11 attacks as well as identify some distinctive effects.
Exhibit 12 extends the analysis of 9/11 of Consumer and Business Confidence Index data
from The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to include the
Financial Crisis.

29

Exhibit 12

Consumer and Business Confidence, 2000-2010

Businesses were much more optimistic prior to the Financial Crisis as compared to 9/11.
The blue vertical line represents 9/11 and the red vertical line signifies the Lehman Brothers’
bankruptcy. Initially, we see that before 9/11 business consumers were more optimistic than
businesses. Comparatively, the heavy deregulation created a bullish optimism in businesses as
compared to the wariness of consumers in the preceding months of the Financial Crisis. Further,
the decline due to the event itself is much more noticeable in the Financial Crisis of 2008 than
the 9/11 attacks. Business Confidence fell approximately 0.5 in response to the attacks before
reverting and Consumer Confidence was barely affected. It seems that Business Confidence in
the Financial Crisis of 2008 was heavily affected by the bankruptcy of major investment banks,
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sending the business confidence index to a bearish 96 around the Lehman Bankruptcy. It seems
that consumer confidence was already declining prior to the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy.
Exhibit 13

Results of Cointegration for Sectors Pre and Post-Financial Crisis
P-value Pre-Crisis

P-value Post-Crisis

Energy and Utilities

<0.01

0.85

Energy and Healthcare

0.95

0.05

Energy and Real Estate 0.73

0.03

Staples and Industrials

0.02

0.94

Compared to the 9/11 attacks, there was less change in cointegration across all
relationships of the sectors. This could be due to the Financial Crisis being a systemic, long-term
problem that affected all facets of the economy. The 9/11 attacks were more so an immediate
shock in the financial center of the world. This is echoed by comparing the correlations of each
sector before and after the Financial Crisis as compared to 9/11.
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Exhibit 14

Correlation Before and After the Financial Crisis

Larger, darker green circles signify correlations close to 1 and larger, darker red circles
represent correlations near -1. Smaller circles with lighter shades signify correlations between
these values. Insignificant correlations are omitted. We can see that before the Financial Crisis,
many sectors were correlated, with some being uncorrelated or insignificant. When looking
beyond the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy we see that every single sector has a significant,
positive correlation. As compared to the 9/11 results, there was a much more systematic change
as far as directionality of sectors. Exhibit 15 shows this sustained, systematic decrease across all
sectors lasting more than 150 days. The grey and magenta lines separated 150 trading day prices
of the 11 sector ETFs before and after the Financial Crisis. Exhibit 16 indicates the post-crisis
150-day holding period return of the magenta, post-crisis prices and separates them by sector.
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Exhibit 15

Financial Sector ETFs Before and After the Financial Crisis

Holding Period Returns were negative across all sectors even 150 days after the Lehman
collapse. Compare this to Post-9/11 returns, which had 9 sectors seeing positive returns after 150
days. Both 9/11 and the Financial Crisis experienced sharp, analogous declines in prices across

Commented [PPD4]: Are these annual returns? Over what
period are these measured?

all industries. However, the decline during the Financial Crisis saw a more sustained decline,

Commented [UBMu5R4]: Fixed in section above

lasting months. This could attribute to the significant and positive correlations. In looking at the
graph above, the behavior of sector prices before the Lehman bankruptcy was somewhat flat.
There is a large decrease in price resultant of the economic collapse.
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Exhibit 16

Holding Period Returns for Sectors Post-Financial Crisis
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An Analysis of COVID-19
The inventor of the Black Swan denies COVID-19 as a Black Swan, as it was
predictable. Taleb explains that governments were initially lax to the possibility of COVID-19
proliferating, saying that preparedness does not equate to fear (Avishai, 2020). Taleb is an expert
in uncertainty and has devoted his life to the understanding of random, impactful events.
However, are we laymen as perceptive to this uncertainty? Is predictability measured by a few
experts in agreement or a widespread public understanding?
Let us look back to the Financial Crisis of 2008, a complicated falling out of the global
financial system in which Taleb credits as a Black Swan. As said by Kapoor (2018), Warren
Buffet predicted the collapse in a 2002 shareholder letter and during a CNN interview in 2006.
Kapoor (2008) goes on to name 7 more experts that expected the Financial Crisis to some
degree. So, if the financial crisis was predicted years before its occurrence, how can it be labeled
a Black Swan? Like COVID-19, no governing authority made any intermediate steps to mitigate
the downfall.

COVID-19 is Predictable, Bubbles Are not
Here I plan to draw a clear distinction between a “hunch” and predictability. Yes, I
indulged in the idea in the above paragraph that some were able to identify a “bubble-Esque”
environment in the Financial Crisis due to the inflation of the housing market paired with suspect
derivatives. But, as said earlier, we are still unable to detect bubbles through models.
Furthermore, a bubble can be derived from a myriad of causes. Peter Garber (1989) wrote
extensively about the Tulipmania phenomenon, as nonprofessional tulip traders created a
frenzied increase in foreign funds that heavily inflated the prices of Tulips. Bizarrely, the
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demand for Tulips disappeared in an instance and the price of a tulip crashed, creating economic
distress (Garber, 1989). According to research done by John Moen (2021), In 1716, economic
theorist John Law planned to repay France’s government debt economy by opening a bank,
massively inflating the currency. The scheme eventually failed once investors demanded capital
gain for their shares bought, causing the share price to plummet, doubling the amount of money
supply in France, and creating a monthly inflation rate of 23% (Moen, 2021). Damien Clavel
(2020) wrote about Gregor Macgregor, who fueled a fraudulent investing opportunity with lies
about a fictitious land of Poyais. Macgregor falsely allured British Capital Market investors to
finance the fake land of “Poyais,” said to be rich in natural resources and ultimately imploded,
repudiating Macgregor as a worthy venture capitalist and causing the bonds to become
completely worthless (Clavel, 2020). As seen across these bubbles, a feverish inflation period
caused mispricing which eventually corrected itself, causing massive damage. A steady pattern
seen across these bubbles is novice or faulty trading techniques.
However, COVID-19 is not a bubble. There was no irrational inflation of prices and it
was seemingly predictable that this event was going to occur. Taleb seems to encapsulate this
view in The Black Swan, as:
“Some events can be rare and consequential, but somewhat predictable,
particularly to those who are prepared for them and have the tools to understand them
(instead of listening to statisticians, economists, and charlatans of the bell-curve variety).
They are near-Black Swans. They are somewhat tractable scientifically—knowing about
their incidence should lower your surprise; these events are rare but expected” (Taleb, pg.
37)
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In 2015 Bill Gates Led a Ted Talk aptly titled, The next outbreak, we’re not ready. He
cited past pandemics, like Ebola, in explaining our unpreparedness for an outbreak. His
complaints focus on our inability to adequately respond to these medical emergencies quickly or
effectively and he accurately described the potential danger Ebola would have posed had it been
infectious through the air (Gates, 2015). Upon COVID-19 rearing its existence in China, Josh
Norman, Nassim Taleb, and Bar-Yam (2020) agreed with Gates, striking the notion that isolation
and contract tracing are sufficient in the early stages of the pandemic and calling for widescale
lopping of communication networks and community self-monitoring. Exhibit 17 is a map of the
stringency index, as measured and plotted by Our World in Data(n.d.). The index uses measures
such as international trade controls, stay-at-home orders, school closures, and many other
policies that can determine just how stringent a government is in reacting to the virus (OWID,
n.d.). On the date of Nassim Taleb’s paper, the only country to have stringent policies against
this novel virus was China. It took until mid-April, as seen in Exhibit 18, for most countries to
reach a stringent policy plan.
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Exhibit 17

Stringency Index of Virus Reaction, January 27, 2020

Exhibit 18

Stringency Index April 21, 2020

38

Instead of taking immediate measures, we were very reactive to COVID-19. A research
paper published in the Journal of Clinical Microbiology Reviews in October of 2007 first warned
of the potential danger of the virus. Cheng, Lau, Woo, and Luen (2007) warned that dangers
posed by a large reservoir of Covid-like viruses coupled with the Southern-Chinese customs of
eating exotic animals are a bomb waiting to explode. The ability of the virus to mutate and affect
humans was found to be concerning and necessitated proper preparedness (Cheng, Lau, Woo,
and Luen, 2007). The article put forth by Charles Schmidt (2020) describes that there was a
pushback against the research of SARS due to lack of funding and interest. Peter Daszak,
president of EcoHealth Alliance, explained that he and a small group of colleagues were the only
western scientists collaborating on the research in face of clear danger (Schmidt, 2020). Thus,
the Coronavirus was adequately predicted, though braked by lack of funding and reaction. The
October 2007 Covid research paper, the warnings of many prominent thinkers including Bill
Gates and Nassim Taleb, and the lack of initial stringency by policymakers leads me to believe
that COVID-19 was in fact predictable. Further, COVID-19 is not a bubble or anomaly, we have
seen it before.

Economic Impacts of COVID-19
Though predictable, the magnitude of COVID-19 cannot be ignored. First, I extend the
business and consumer confidence graph to include COVID-19, as I show in Exhibit 19. The
green dotted lines represent the date used to represent COVID-19. First, we had a strong period
of confidence, seeing that both CCI and BCI were above 100 prior to Covid. Comparatively, our
economy was more pessimistic before 9/11 and the Financial Crisis. Let us look specifically at
the COVID-19 period. Business confidence declines slowly and early whereas consumer
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confidence remains high until right around the World Health Organization press conference, as
shown by the green vertical line.
Exhibit 19

Consumer and Business Confidence Indexes, 2000-2020

The relationship between discretionary income and staples can bring about ideas in how
consumers feel about the future. If one is quite certain that the economy will persist, more money
will be spent on entertainment and leisure. If the public is more stressed about the long-term
economy, more money will be moved towards necessary household items like non-durable
household products. When COVID-19 started wreaking havoc in the U.S in early March, many
people rushed to supermarkets, hoarding copious amounts of toilet paper in fear of future
lockdowns. Jen Wieczner (2020) writes that on March 12, 2020 sales of toilet paper burgeoned
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734% as compared to the previous day as consumers were frantically pruning stores of their TP,
making it a scarce commodity. The panicked buying of household staples is seen by the steep
decline in consumer confidence seen in Exhibit 19. The sheer slope of the decline alludes to a
sense of panic, a steep decline in future expectations. There was no means to discern just how
damaging and widespread COVID-19 could be. Consumer staples become extremely sought
after in times of long-term ambiguity.
In comparing the aggregate return of all sectors, as shown in Exhibit 20, COVID-19 falls
between 9/11 and the Financial Crisis. The Technology, Materials, Discretionary, and Healthcare
sectors were able to end with positive, yet small returns. Exhibit 20 bears these respective 150
day holding period returns during COVID-19.
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Exhibit 20

During COVID-19 Holding Period Returns
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Exhibit 21

Cointegration results Pre and during COVID-19
p-value Pre-Covid

p-value Covid

Technology and Materials

0.795

0.034

Technology and Discretionary

0.273

0.002

Energy and Utilities

0.011

0.478

Energy and Materials

0.043

0.098

Energy and Staples

0.011

0.140

Energy and Discretionary

0.019

0.066

Energy and Industrial

0.013

0.490

Energy and Healthcare

0.008

0.052

Energy and Financials

0.010

0.847

Energy and Real Estate

0.021

0.738

Utilities and Materials

0.886

0.001

Utilities and Staples

0.557

0.008

Utilities and Discretionary

0.257

0.000

Utilities and Healthcare

0.603

0.000

Utilities and Financials

0.872

0.004

Utilities and Real Estate

0.025

0.379

Materials and Discretionary

0.546

0.000

Materials and Industrial

0.027

0.149

Materials and Financials

0.001

0.546

Industrial and Financials

0.021

0.632

Financial and Real Estate

0.789

0.001

One quite interesting result is in the cointegration tests, with the results provided in Exhibit
21. Of the 3 events studied, COVID-19 had the most changes in cointegration by far. First, we see
that the Energy sector, which experienced the lowest COVID-19 period return, also experienced
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the most changes in cointegration. One unique issue brought about by COVID-19 was the strain
on an already volatile oil market, as reflected in the Energy sector’s pricing. This is due in part to
a liquidity issue caused by an economic pullback from COVID-19, as developing countries have
relied on short-term capitalization in recent years (OECD, 2020). Compounding this energy issue,
a price war between Russia and Saudi Arabia caused the greatest increase in oil production in the
last 30 years and subsequently crashed the price of oil to levels not seen since 2002 (Smith, 2020).
Thus, oil was being produced at astronomical rates, driving the price of oil as low as -$37.63 per
barrel of West Texas Intermediate (BBC, 2020). The two graphs below demonstrate the precipitous
loss of value in Oil and the Energy sector. Exhibit 22 shows the historic price drop of WTI barrels
whereas Exhibit 23 shows the SP500 Energy Sector ETF as compared to other struggling sectors
due to COVID-19.
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Exhibit 22

WTI Price Per Barrel, May 2019 – September 2020
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Exhibit 23

COVID-19 Struggling Sectors

Another facet of the economy that was heavily affected by the economic shutdown of
COVID-19 was unemployment. The Congressional Research Service (2021) compares the sheer
spike in unemployment as compared to the financial crisis, explaining:

“The unemployment rate peaked at 10% in October 2009, four months after the
recession officially concluded. In the current recession, the unemployment rate increased
from 3.5% in February 2020 to 4.4% in March 2020, peaked at 14.8% in April, and then
fell to 6.7% in December. The peak represents the quickest month-over-month increase in
unemployment rates and the highest overall unemployment rate since the CPS data started
being collected in 1948” (Congressional Research Service, 2021).
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In Exhibit 24 the vertical red and green lines represent The Financial Crisis and COVID19, respectively. COVID-19 brought about a more momentous, yet short-term increase in the
unemployment rate compared to the financial crisis. The unemployment crisis during COVID-19
was due to increasingly stringent social distancing policies whereas the financial crisis where more
due to the tightening of the economy.
Exhibit 24

Unemployment Rate: Financial Crisis and COVID-19

Seen in Exhibit 25 is the daily closing prices of the VIX volatility index 2000-2020,
retrieved from Yahoo Finance. The blue, red and green lines represent 9/11, the Financial Crisis,
and COVID-19, respectively. The VIX composite was created by the Chicago Board of Options
(CBOE) has been colloquially termed the “fear index” by many in the finance world. As said by
CBOE (n.d), the VIX index utilizes calls and puts on the SP500 index to derive an idea of the
expected volatility throughout the upcoming 30 days and is used by many financial management
experts as a proxy for future volatility. 9/11 is comparable to other medium-sized increases in
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volatility throughout history. However, both the Financial Crisis and COVID-19 break respective
volatility records within this time period. The VIX skyrocketed to 80.86 during the Financial Crisis
and then to 82.69 during COVID-19. According to 30-day volatility brought forth by the VIX,
both COVID-19 and the Financial Crisis carried the most impact throughout the last 30 years.
Exhibit 25

Daily ^VIX Prices 2000-2020
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Conclusion
The question being studied in this paper is whether the COVID-19 pandemic should be
considered a Black Swan. A Black Swan carries significant impact and is unpredictable. After the
fact, many attempts to concoct an explanation to make it more predictable than it was. COVID-19
was compared to both the 9/11 attacks and the Financial Crisis, which have both been regarded as
true Black Swans. Most of the paper delves into the predictability and impact of the events. In
testing the relationship of 11 major sectors of the economy, COVID-19 caused more changes than
both 9/11 and the Financial Crisis combined. COVID-19 also caused unemployment to rise and
oil price per barrel to fall to unprecedented levels. There were large downward movements of both
consumer and business confidence during COVID-19 and the Financial Crisis, as compared to
9/11. In summary, the sheer magnitude of COVID-19 is quite comparable to the Financial Crisis
and even seems to be more crucial in some regards. However, the difficulty posed in this question
is regarding the predictability of the pandemic. Many papers alluded to possible downward
adjustments due to over-excitement in the housing market before the crisis. However, it was
concluded through the Efficient Market Hypothesis and lack of public prediction that the bubble
was in fact predictable. In contrast, COVID-19 was predicted and warned of years before its
proliferation. Lack of research and public interest paired with slow policymaking by world
governments allowed COVID-19 to spread incredibly fast. Further research can ponder the
question further of whether COVID-19 was in fact predictable.
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